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THE DECENTRALIZATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: 
A LITERATURE REVIEW AND COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
HARRY C. KATZ* 
The author reviews evldence that the bargaming structure is becoming 
more decentralized in S'weden, Australia, the former West Germany, Italy, the 
Unlted Ingdom, and the Unlted States, although In somewhat different 
degrees and ways from country to country He then examines the various 
hypotheses that have been offered to explaln t h ~ s  lgnlficant trend Shifts In 
bargaining power, as well as the diversification of corporate and worker 
Interests, have played a part in this change, he concludes, but work reorganl- 
zatlon has been more influentlal still. He also explores how the roles of central 
unions and corporate irkdustrial relat~ons taffs are challenged by bargalnlng 
structure decentralization, and discusses the research gaps on this subject that 
need to be filled. 
R eports have appeared since the early 1980s suggesting that the locus of collec- 
tive bargaining is shifting downward in a 
number of countries, often from a national 
or multi-company level to the firm or plant 
level. This paper reviews evidence concern- 
ing recent decentralization in the structure 
of collective bargaining in six countries: Swe- 
den, Australia, the former West Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United 
States. Those countries, for which there is a 
sizable literature on recent changes in the 
locus of collective bargaining, represent a 
wide range in the degree to which bargaining 
was centralized as of 1980. At that time, col- 
lective bargaining in Sweden ancl Australia 
was extremely centralized; In Germany and 
*The author, Professor at the NewYorkState School 
of lndustrlal and Labor Relations (NYSSILR), Cornell 
Unlvers~ty, thanks George Strauss, Peter Katzensteln, 
and partlclpants at workshops held at the Sloan School 
of Management, MIT, and the NYSSILRfor their many 
helpful suggestions 
Italy, moderately centralized; and in the 
United Kingdom and the United States, rela- 
tively decentralized. 
This review examines both the formal struc- 
ture of bargaining, which applies to the em- 
ployees covered by a collective bargaining 
agreement, and informal bargaining struc- 
tures (such as pattern bargaining, whereby a 
lead settlement is followed closely in other 
negotiations). In addition, since many im- 
portant industrial relauons matters are settled 
through written or oral agreements that are 
not necessarily included in formal written 
contracts, I also consider changes in the lo- 
cus and intensity of i n f o r q l  negotiations. 
After reviewing the substantial evidence 
suggesting that bargaining structure is be- 
coming more decentralized, I evaluate sev- 
eral hypotheses that have been offered to 
explain this development. Some of these hy- 
potheses appear to be more credible than 
others in the light of a comparison of the 
experiences of the six countries. 
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INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
The Complex Nature and Role 
of Bargaining Structure 
Bargaining structure has been recognized 
as influential because it affects the process of 
bargaining. We know that access to detailed 
information about the direct and indirect 
participants to a labor agreement is the pre- 
condition for understanding how bargaining 
occurs. The structure of bargaining also is 
important as it affects bargaining outcomes 
and the roles of unions and management. 
From Commons (1909) and Ulman (1955) 
on, it has been observed that unions often 
centralize bargaining to strengthen their le- 
verage at the bargaining table. 
History also demonstrates, however, that 
although in many cases unions prefer cen- 
tralized bargaining (to take working condi- 
tions out of competition) and employers pre- 
fer decentralized bargaining (to respond to 
local conditions and gain whipsaw advan- 
tage), the parties' preferences are not always 
so simply ordered. In some cases, for ex- 
ample, unions prefer firm-level over indus- 
try-level bargaining because the former gives 
them a power advantage.' In some other 
cases, both large employers and their unions 
favor industrywide bargaining as a device 
through which they can "cartelize" the indus- 
try and drive out low-cost compet i t i~n.~ 
We have also come to understand that 
bargaining structure both influences and is 
influenced by the distribution of bargaining 
power. Yet, data that allow clear tests of the 
effects of changes in bargaining structure on 
bargaining outcomes generally have not been 
available. 
The difficulty of assessing the effects of 
bargaining structure arises in part from the 
fact that there is no simple measure of the 
degree of bargain~ng structure centraliza- 
tion, because the location of collective bar- 
gaining often differs depending on the sub- 
ject of bargaining. In many countries, wages 
are negotiated in company or sectoral agree- 
- 
' U  S automobile collective bargalnlng 1s an ex- 
ample of t h ~ s  bargaln~ng structure (Katz 1985:29-38) 
?In the post-World War Two per~od,  bargalnlng In 
the U S ~nter-clty trucklngand coal ~ndustr~esfollowed 
t h ~ s  pattern (Wlll~amson 1968) 
ments, and work rules are set at a lower level, 
often in plant agreements. Furthermore, 
worker participation in decision making of- 
ten occurs at still another bargaining level, or 
through informal mechanisms (works coun- 
cils or shop floor discussions, for example) 
rather than through collective bargaining 
agreements. 
Still, as reported in this paper, it is possible 
to point to suggestive evidence concerning 
the effects of recent decentralization on bar- 
gaining outcomes. In addition, we know that 
bargaining structure exerts significant effects 
on the internal politics of unions. Recent 
research also examines how the roles of cor- 
porate industrial relations staffs are being 
altered by the movement toward more de- 
centralized bargaining structures. 
Recent Changes in Bargaining Structure 
in Six Countries3 
Sweden 
Sweden has long been viewed as the 
archetypical case of highly centralized bar- 
gaining, given the dominant role played by 
the national agreement negotiated between 
the employers' confederation (SAF) and the 
blue-collar union confederation (LO) 
(Swenson 1989). Beginning in 1956, the SAF- 
LO agreement provided recommended wage 
increases, stipulations concerning non-wage 
issues, and often other detailed recommen- 
dations concerning employment conditions 
to the national affiliates of the LO and SAF 
The subsequent sectoral agreements often 
closely followed these recommendations, and 
company-level bargaining (and agreements) 
went on to supplement the sectoral agree- 
3As br~efly remarked above, 1 chose these SIX coun- 
tries In part because they represent a w ~ d e  spectrum In 
the degree of central~zat~on f thelr barga~nlng struc- 
ture at  the start of the period In question, and partly 
because of the avallab~hty of much l~terature wrltten In 
Engllsh In recent year son bargalnlng structure In these 
countrles One referee suggested that thls paper also 
analyze recent experience In Canada and Japan. In my 
vlew, not much of Interest has changed In recent years 
In Japan's bargalnlng structure, and developments In 
Canada do not d~ffer  slgnlficantly from the trends 
apparent In the SIX countrles 1 examlne 
Coovriaht O 2001. All Riahts Reserved 
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ments. This relatively centralized bargaining 
resulted in moderate pay settlements and 
relatively low strike frequency (Swenson 
1989). In addition, unions used the structure 
to implement their policy of wage solidarity 
(the negotiation of limited intra- and inter- 
" 
industry wage differentials), which was a key 
part of the "Swedish model." 
After 1984, the dominance of the central 
agreement declined (EIRR 1992a). In 1984, 
industry-level bargaining completely replaced 
the SAF-LO agreement. In 1985 and 1986. 
there were S&LO agreements, but these 
agreements differed from those of past years 
in their treatment of non-wage issues, on 
" 
which they included more recommendations 
and fewer stipulations. National wage bar- 
gaining was replaced again by industry-level 
bargaming in 1988. In 1991 there was a medi- 
ated national central two-year agreement that 
forbade local-level wage bargaining (EIRR 
1991:28). A complete break with the tradi- 
tional centralized SAF-LO agreement is likely 
in the future, because in February 1991 the 
SAF abruptly announced it would no longer 
take part in central negotiations and dis- 
banded its wage bargaining staff. 
There have also appeared numerous re- 
ports of increases in the intensity and depth 
of firm-level bargaining (~ontusson and 
Swenson 1992; EIRR 1992a). In a sharp break 
with the past, a number of these firm-level (or 
plant-level) agreements in recent years in- 
cluded profit sharing and other contingent 
pay mechanisms that linked worker pay in- 
creases to firm or worker or to 
worker skill level (Pontusson and Swenson 
1992:21). As we shall see, the emergence of 
contingent pay is afrequent occurrence in all 
the countries reviewed in this paper. 
The traditional Swedish bargaining struc- 
ture included a substantial amount of firm- 
and plant-level bargaining, which led to "wage 
drift" (Swenson 1989; Flanagan, Soskice, and 
Ulman 1983). Thus, it is not the presence of 
local bargaining that distinguishes recent 
experience. ~ a i h e r ,  what is kew is the ab- 
sence of a central SAF-LO agreement in a 
number of recentvears. em~lovers' refusal to 
I - I /  
engage in further central bargaining, and 
the intensity and depth of local bargaining 
over non-wage issues. 
In the 1980s, large employers that had 
previously supported centralized collective 
bargaining, particularly those in the engi- 
neering sector and their influential Engi- 
neering Employers' Association (which in- 
cludes the auto manufacturers), favored a 
shift toward decentralized collective bargain- 
ing. They complained bitterly of heightened 
international competitive pressures and the 
resulting need for lower labor costs and wider 
skill differentials, and they argued that de- 
centralized bargaining would help them re- 
spond to these pressures by giving them more 
flexibility and bargaining leverage. Many 
small employers were less eager to decentral- 
ize bargaining, apparently fearing that it 
would strengthen union power by giving 
unions the capability to whipsaw employers 
and in other ways introduce greater instabil- 
ity in industrial relations. In Sweden, as in 
most of the other countries analyzed in this 
paper, the central unions have sought to 
retain centralized bargaining.* 
Australia 
Australia also traditionally has had rela- 
tively centralized collective bargaining, but 
of a very different complexion from that in 
Sweden. The Australian collective bargain- 
ing system is noteworthy for its heavy reliance 
on "industrial tribunals" and a compulsory 
arbitration system that operates at the fed- 
eral level and in four of six states (Dabscheck 
and Niland 1981:305-7). In this system wage 
minima (and sometimes wage increases) were 
set in the national and industry "awards" 
issued by the industrial tribunals. Industry- 
and in some cases firm-level bargaining tradi- 
tionally provided supplements to these awards 
("overawards") , devlsed the specific terms by 
which these wage awards were implemented, 
and negotiated other employment condi- 
tions. The Australian industrial relations svs- 
tem also has been noteworthy for a relatively 
high presence of craft- or occupation-based 
unions. a union structure that influenced 
both the wage award system and the supple- 
4The material In th~s  paragraph draws heady from 
Pontusson and Swenson (1992) and EIRR (1992a) 
Copvright O 2001. All Rights Reserved 
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mentary industry- and firm-level collective 
bargaining. 
Given the traditional heavy reliance on 
tribunals and compulsory arbitration, it is 
fitting that more decentralized collective 
bargaining has been spurred in recent years 
in Australia by national wage cases (cases 
determining wages or wage increases for all 
workers covered by federal awards) and the 
decisions in these cases issued by the Austra- 
lian Industrial Relations Commission. In 
August 1988, a national wage case decision 
instituted a "structural efficiency principle," 
encouraging lower-level negotiations to 
modify wage awards so as to "improve eco- 
nomic efficiency and provide workers with 
access to more varied, fulfilling and better 
paid jobs" (cited in Rimmer and Verevis 
1990:l). In the 1988 national wage case deci- 
sion the Commission stated that the goal of 
lower-level bargaining and the restructuring 
of awards was to "establish skill related career 
paths; eliminate impediments to multi- 
skilling; create appropriate relativities within 
the award and at the enterprise; ensure that 
working patterns and arrangements enhance 
flexibility and efficiency; include properly 
fixed 'minimum rates' for award classifica- 
tions; [and] address any discriminatory pro- 
visions contained within the awards" (cited in 
Rimmer and Verevis 1990:l). 
That decision was followed in 1989 by a 
national wage case decision requiring "award 
restructuring" involving negotiations at the 
industry or firm level (or both) that may 
include productivity bargains, issues related 
to the lmplementation of wage changes, and 
associated changes in work rules and work 
practices.   ward restructuring at the Ford 
Motor Company, for example, involved re- 
ductions in the number ofjob classifications, 
encouragement of teamwork, and employee 
involvement in the development of training 
programs (Lansburg 1993: 12-1 3). 
A 1991 national wage case decision explic- 
itly promoted "enterprise bargaining" (bar- 
gaining at the firm level, plant level, or both). 
A 1992 national wage case decision further 
encouraged enterprise bargaining, and 
amendments to the Industrial Relations 
Act in 1992 reduced the Industrial Rela- 
tions Commission's role in reviewing en- 
terprise agreements (Lansbury 1993:12). 
In Australia, as in Sweden, the engineer- 
ing sector (which included the automobile 
manufacturers) pressed for more decentral- 
ized bargaining (Macken 1989:33-42). Up 
through the early 1970s, collective bargain- 
ing covering the auto companies was coordi- 
nated across companies by a strong employer 
federation and a body represenhng the unions 
that had members in the industry. In the late 
1970s, however, the large auto firms began 
negotiating separate company agreements 
that included a substantial degree of varia- 
tion in pay and other employment terms 
across the companies. In recent years a num- 
ber of important plan t-level agreements were 
negotiated, and some of these agreements 
included pay-for-knowledge procedures and 
other new pay administration features. Com- 
pany-level agreements have now also spread 
to many of the smaller firms involved in auto 
parts manufacturing.' 
The effect of these wage decisions and 
other economic pressures has been to in- 
crease the extent of collective bargaining at 
the industry, firm, and plant levels. Some of 
this decentralized bargaining has followed as 
part of labor and management's efforts to 
satisfy the specific requirements of the indus- 
trial relations commission concerning struc- 
tural efficiency and award restructuring. The 
extent of firm- and plant-level bargaining 
varies widely, and there is disagreement in 
the academic community over whether they 
are only a recent phen~menon .~  At the same 
time, there is widespread agreement that 
there is a trend toward decentralization. This 
recognition has spurred a debate in the Aus- 
tralian industrial relations community regard- 
ing the advantages of "managed decentralism" 
versus either retention of the old tribunal- 
arbitration system or a more comprehensive 
5l benefitedgreatly from ~nput  from Russell Lansbury 
and Mark Bray, who helped clar~fy AustralIan events 
They bear no respons~b~l~ty, of course, for my lnterpre- 
tatlon of these events 
6Even w~th recent changes, workplace barga~nlng 
st111 1s rather l ~ m ~ t e d  The 1989-90 workplace survey 
states that "at one-th~rd of workplaces, barga~nlng took 
place between management and delegates from the 
unlon coverlng most employees" (Callus, Morehead, 
Cully, and Buchanan 1991 14) 
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shift to "enterprise bargaining" (Lansbury 
and Niland 1992; Bray 1991). 
In contrast to the experience in the other 
countries reviewed in this paper, in Australia 
the central union federation (the Australian 
Confederation of Trade Unions, ACTU) has 
supported decentralizat~on.' As Bray (1 991) 
notes, the ACTU "favored a decentralization 
of bargaining towards the enterprise level 
provided this occurred within a strong cen- 
tralized framework (at national and industry 
levels) ." The ACTU's support for decentrali- 
zation derived from (and the labor move- 
ment said it was contingent on) the continu- 
ation of the "Accord," an incomes policy 
involving the Australian federal government 
and the labor movement. The Accord ini- 
tially "envisaged federalgovernment support 
for full wage indexation in return for the 
unions pledging to make 'no extra claims' 
for wage increases" (Lansbury and Niland 
1992:2). Full wage indexation meant that 
wages rose as much as the cost of living. The 
Accord continues (it IS now in a seventh 
phase), but it no longer provides for full 
wage indexation. 
There are also frequent reports of shop 
floor and plant-level negotiations that in- 
volve significant changes in work organiza- 
tion. Some of the cited cases involve the 
introduction of team systems of work and 
large reductions in the number ofjob classi- 
fications. At some sites team work is associ- 
ated with the introduction of pay-for-knowl- 
edge schemes and more extensive worker 
participation (Mathews 1989). 
It is noteworthy that the trend in union 
structure in Australia runs somewhat counter 
to the decentralization occurring in bargain- 
ing structure. In Australia, as (we shall see) in 
the United kngdom, recently there has been 
significant consolidation in unlon structure, 
involving the merger of craft- or occupation- 
based unions Into either multi-skill or, in 
some cases, industrywide unions. For the 
unions, consolidation is attractive partly 
because of the advantages coordination pro- 
'See, for example, Sword (1992) for the views o n  
enterprise bargalnlng of  the Nat~onal Secretary of  the 
Nat~onal U n ~ o n  of Workers 
vides during industry- or firm-level bargain- 
ing (Rimmer and Verevis 1990). 
Germany 
The collective bargaining structure in 
Germany (bywhich, in this paper, I mean the 
former West Germany) involves master labor 
agreements that are negotiated regionally 
and cover industrial sectors. Union participa- 
tion in this process is coordinated by central 
unions, the most important being the 16 
national unions covering industrial sectors 
affiliated with the Deutscher Gewerkschafts- 
bund (DGB) (Turner 1991:96-97). The ne- 
gotiated agreements cover wage increases 
and provide either specific or "framework" 
language concerning other employment 
terms. 
Informal bargaining at the company and 
plant level sometimes occurs. In the 1970s 
(and for some firms later) this supplemen- 
tary bargaining ("second rounds") produced 
sizable wage drift (Thelen 1991). At the 
plant level unions can use their influence on 
works councils to veto overtime and in other 
ways exercise bargaining leverage against 
management (Streeck 1984a; Thelen 1991; 
Turner 1992). Yet, company- or plant-level 
bargaining in Germany does not lead to con- 
tractual agreements, nor can unions legally 
initiate strikes over disagreements arising in 
this supplementary bargaining. 
Another key feature of the German indus- 
trial relations system is the parallel represen- 
tation workers receive through codeter- 
mination procedures providing elected rep- 
resentatives with seats on firm supervisory 
boards and works councils. The works coun- 
cils address personnel matters, and in this 
way they provide plant- and firm-level forums 
for negotiation over matters that in some 
other countries are addressed in local collec- 
tive bargaining agreements (Streeck 1984a) 
'By federal law, the works counc~ls are not allowed 
to str~ke over d~sputes reached In t h e ~ r  drscuss~ons. It 
should also be noted that unlon membersh~p and 
works councll membersh~p are not always mutually 
exclusive, lndlv~duals active In or loyal to unrons In 
many firms hold a suable fract~on of the works councll 
worker seats (Streeck 1984a; Turner 1991) 
Copvriaht O 2001. All Rights Reserved 
8 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW 
In contrast to the experience in the other 
five countries examined here, no change in 
the formal structure of bargaining has oc- 
curred in Germany in recent years. The struc- 
ture described above continues to prevail. 
On the other hand, a number of analysts have 
observed a significant shift toward decen- 
tralization in the importance and amount of 
negotiations that occur inside the works coun- 
cils at the plant level. Workshop discussions 
concerning the implementation of changes 
in work practices have also increased. As 
Thelen (1991 :155) describes it, 'The balance 
within the dual system is shifting toward plant- 
level bargaining." In an insightful early analy- 
sis, Streeck (1984b:306) identified (and fore- 
cast the intensification of) centrifugal ten- 
dencies in the German industrial relations 
system signaling "emergent enterprise union- 
ism." Streeck and others claim that "qualita- 
tive demands" have increased in their i m ~ o r -  
tance and that these demands are being 
settled through "productivity coalitions" be- 
ing formed at the plant or work group level, 
which often involve works councils (Windolf 
1989; Turner 1991; Thelen 1991). 
As in other countries. in Germanv the 
productivity coalitions being negotiated at 
the plant and workshop level typically involve 
changes in work organization and team work. 
In some cases the discussions are so compre- 
hensive that they allow the works council to 
become, as Streeck (1984b:308) put it, the 
"co-manager of the internal labor market." 
Turner's (1991) analysis of recent labor-man- 
aeement relations inihe German auto indus- 
" 
try provides numerous illustrations of the 
depth of works council penetration into per- 
sonnel and work organization matters. ~ h e s e  
negotiations include topics such as the con- 
seauences for workers of the introduction of 
new technology, the adjustments policies in- 
troduced to respond to displacement, and 
the form and procedures through which team- 
work is introduced. 
The central union (in the auto Industry it 
is I G Metall) is often heavily involved in 
stimulating and guiding the firm- and plant- 
level negotiations. Turner (1991:lll-17) 
describes, for example, how I G Metal1 for- 
mulated and then promoted specific propos- 
als for "group work." Nevertheless, works 
councils are being granted greater authority 
in the implementation of group work, the 
modification of other employment terms, and 
the negotiations surrounding these issues. 
Although the formal structure of collec- 
tive bargaining has not changed, a more 
decentralized bargaining structure has re- 
sulted from changes in the sectoral collective 
bargaining agreements. On certain key is- 
sues, those agreements no longer provide 
either specific stipulations or binding minima; 
rather, they define parameters for plant-level 
bargaining. 
The reduction ofworking hours after 1984, 
well described in Thelen (1991:161-75), il- 
lustrates how this change has occurred. The 
sectoral agreements (first those negotiated 
by I G Metall) defined specific target dates 
for reductions in work time. These sectoral 
agreements, however, only provided guide- 
lines for subsequent plant-level negotiations 
concerning the exact terms and form of the 
work hours reduction. The sectoral agree- 
ments allowed for an uneven distribution of 
work-time reduction across the work force 
and gave employers the freedom to vary work 
hours from week to week (Thelen 1991:165). 
Furthermore, as Thelen documents, wide 
variation followed across firms and plants in 
how the work time reductions occurred and 
in related changes made to work organiza- 
tion to facilitate the new work time arrange- 
ments. In the process, sectoral agreeme&, 
although still a critical influence on wage 
increases, became less influential with regard 
to the many non-wage issues that surfaced at 
the plant level. 
There are also recent signs of dissatisfac- 
tion within employer ranks with the tradi- 
tional heavy role played by industry bargain- 
ing. Medlum and small employers, in par- 
ticular, have been complaining that "the ri- 
gidity and uniformity of existing structures 
are undermining their flexibility and ability 
to compete" (EIRR 1992b:12). 
Collective bargaining in Italy occurs at 
numerous, frequently overlapping levels 
(EIRR 1992~) .  The traditional centerpiece of 
Itallan collective bargaining was a set of 
D 
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master industrywide agreements negotiated 
by national industry unions and employer 
 association^.^ Negotiations by union locals at 
individual firms followed shortly thereafter, 
providing language and details implement- 
ing the terms agreed to in the national con- 
tracts (Locke 1992; Locke, forthcoming, 183). 
In the 1980s thls pattern was modified as the 
importance of the national industrywide con- 
tracts declined. In some industries, national 
industry contracts either were not developed 
or were not implemented. In some other 
cases, the industry contracts were negotiated 
after a number of local agreements were 
reached and followed the terms agreed to in 
these local contracts (Locke, foithcoming; 
Windolf 1989; Regalia and Regini 1992). By 
1991. there were even discussions within sev- 
eral unions about formally ending national 
industrywide contracts and replacing them 
with subsectoral or regional contracts (Locke, 
forthcornlng, 214). 
Very much as in other countries, com- 
pany- and plant-level agreements were be- 
coming more important in Italy by the late 
1980s. By 1990,38% of companies concluded 
a company- or plant-level agreement (EIRR 
1992~) .  The rise in the importance of local 
bargaining is illustrated by bargaming at 
Intersind/ASAP coverlng state holding com- 
panies, including companies In the petro- 
chemical and telecommunicat~ons industries. 
The 1991 national agreement covering the 
Intersind/ASAP state sector defines all basic 
conditions of employment, including basic 
payrates, information and trade union rights, 
job classification systems, working time, and 
the designation of subjects that are to be 
bargained over at the enterprise level. Enter- 
prise bargaining deals with working arrange- 
mentsand schedules, work organization, tech- 
nolog~cal innovation, plant Yelocations, ap- 
gThese lndustryw~de agreements were negot~ated 
by the three "peak" trade unlons In Italy, the CGIL, 
CISL, and UIL. In a particular year's bargalnlng round, 
a lead~ng firm was targeted by the unlons, and after an 
agreement was reached at t h ~ s  firm, the nat~onal indus- 
try contract was formed through the d ~ f f u s ~ o n  of t h ~ s  
agreement, w ~ t h  only mlnor mod~f icat~on,  to the rest of  
the Industry These contracts were negot~ated every 
three years, and renewal was often automatic (Locke, 
forthcom~ng, 182-83) 
plication of the job classification system, and 
other local matters. With regard to pay, only 
increases related to productivity can be bar- 
gained at the enterprise level (EIRR 
1992c:21). In the past, enterprise bargaining 
in Italy was much more limited and informal 
(Locke 1992). 
As in Germany, the reduction and regula- 
tion of work time in Italy had replaced wages 
as the central issue in collective bargaining 
negotiations by the late 1980s. Furthermore, 
in Italy as in other countries, although na- 
tional-level bargaining addressed work time, 
the national contracts typically established 
work hour targets and left decisions concern- 
ing how to implement and regulate the new 
work arrangements to local negotiations."' 
And as in Germany, discussions concerning 
work time reductions in Italy often became 
enveloped in wide-ranging modifications of 
work rules, employment patterns involving 
the use of part-time and temporary workers, 
and work organization. 
In addition, at many plants in Italy local 
unions and managers agreed to extenslve 
changes in work organization and pay proce- 
dures as they formed productivity coalitions. 
There were wide variations in the work orga- 
nization changes and the degree of confllct 
in these plant-level negotiations. Further- 
more, "there is a growing divergence be- 
tween bargaining in companies and that at 
higher levels. At the lower level, there seems 
to be an increasing common concern tojointly 
manage industrial relations processes in a 
manner quite divorced from events at the 
centralized level" (EIRR 1992c:24). 
Although the decline in the Importance of 
national industrywide contracts was wide- 
spread in Italy, there was simultaneously some 
movement upward in the locus of collective 
bargaining. During the 1980s there were 
important "tripartite" agreements negotiated 
by union confederations, employer assocla- 
tibns, and government officials.li The focus 
'Osee Locke's descr~pt~on of t h ~ s  pattern In the 
text~ le  Industry (forthcornlng, 184-85). Also see 
Wlndolf (1989) 
"The nat~onal industry unlons provlde 50% of the 
delegates to the confederal unlon congresses (Locke, 
forthcom~ng, p 231) 
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In these tripartite agreements was on wage 
increases; in particular, the key issue in dis- 
pute was the role to be played by a cost-of- 
living escalator (the scala mobile). 
United Kingdom 
In Britain, two types of decentralization 
occurred in the structure of bargaining dur- 
ine the 1980s and earlv 1990s. One involved 
" 
a decline in the number of multi-employer 
agreements. The number of multi-employer 
agreements had been declining since the 
1950s, but the decline accelerated in the 
1980s as multi-employer agreements were 
replaced byeither singleemployer or, in some 
cases, plant-level contracts (Brown and Walsh 
1991). Declines in the amount of multi-em- 
ployer bargaining from the late 1970s are 
well documented in the British workplace 
industrial relations surveys (Brown 1981; 
Daniel and Millward 1983; Millward and 
Stevens 1986; Marginson etal. 1988; Millward 
et al. 1992). In fact, those surveys are without 
parallel in other countries with respect to the 
level of detail and longitudinal comparability 
they provide on the structure of bargaining. 
There is also wides~read case analysis of the 
shlft away from multi-employer bargaining. 
(See, for example, Marglnson et al. 1988; 
IRRR 1989, 1990.) There are no major ex- 
amples of movements in the opposite direc- 
tion, from company-level to multi-employer 
bargaining. 
Multi-employer bargaining has persisted 
in industries such as textiles, footwear, retail- 
ing, and clothing, but even in these cases its 
role has weakened because its function has 
often shifted to the setting of only minimum 
employment terms (Marginson e t  al. 
1988:141). In the industries in which multi- 
employer bargaining has persisted, employ- 
ers (with low capital requlrements and rela- 
tively small scale) feared that company- or 
plant-level bargaining would strengthen the 
unions' ability to engage in whipsaw tactics 
and in other ways bring instability to the 
process of bargaining (Marginson et al. 
1988: 141-43). As in other countries, central 
unions generally opposed the shift away from 
multl-employer bargaining, and the process 
proceeded in response to employer ~nitiatives. 
A second decentralizing movement oc- 
curred in Britain through the replacement of 
companywide labor agreements with agree- 
ments reached at the plant, division, business 
unit, or profit center level (Brown and Walsh 
1991; IRRR 1989; Marginson et al. 1988; 
Purcell and Ahlstand 1989). In some compa- 
nies, the negotiation of paywas decentralized 
downward while work hours and hollday bar- 
gaining continued to be settled in company- 
level negotiations (IRRR 1989). Further- 
more, there was much variation in the degree 
to which informal pattern bargaining across 
plants, for example, continued to produce 
standardization in employment terms within 
companies even in the absence of a 
companywide contract (Marginson et al. 
1988:151). In addition, there has been some 
centralization of bargaining within plants 
through the weakening of shop stewards and 
the enhanced professionalization of person- 
nel staffs. 
As in Australia, the shift to company-level 
bargaining in Britain was in some cases ac- 
com~anied bv the consolidation of union 
structures. The spread of so-called single table 
bargaining (in which a single employer bar- 
gainsjointly with several unionswith which it 
had previously negotiated individually) of- 
ten involved the joiningofunions represent- 
ing manual andstaff unions, as occbrred at 
Lucas Industries (IRRR 1989; Marginson and 
Sisson 1990). 
In addition, for some unionized technical 
and clerical staffs, an even more extreme 
form of bargaining decentralization occurred 
through the introduction of indimdual labor 
contracts (IRRR 1989). These employees now 
had their pay (and in some cases also other 
employment terms) set through individual 
contracts rather than through the traditional 
company-level contracts. Short of the com- 
plete removal of union representation, it is 
difficult to see how bargaining could become 
any more decentralized than individual 
contracts. 
There are also widespread reports of sub- 
stantial increases in the intensity and impor- 
tance of plant- or work group-level bargain- 
ing concerning work organization and re- 
lated issues. Although the use of team work 
appears to be less extensive in Britain than in 
I 
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many other countries, the negotiation of 
"functional flexibility," new work time ar- 
rangements, and more contingent pay meth- 
ods spread to a number of work sites (Sisson 
1992; Marginson et al. 1988). There also is 
clear evidence of more frequent direct com- 
munication between managers and workers. 
United States 
As in Britain, in the United States the 
structure of bargaining affecting unionized 
employees in the early 1980s was a mixture of 
multi-employer, firmwide, and plant-level 
bargaining. Furthermore, during the 1980s 
the structure of bargaining in the United 
States underwent changes that were similar 
to the types of decentralization under way in 
the United Kingdom. Multi-employer bar- 
gaining in the United States in some cases 
ended; the basic steel agreement, for ex- 
ample, was abandoned in 1986. In some other 
cases, the number of firms and unionized 
employees covered by a multi-firm agree- 
ment declined as some companies withdrew 
from master agreements. Two examples of 
this occurrence were in trucking, where the 
Master Freight Agreement nego%ated by the 
Teamsters and an employers' association set 
terms for inter-city truck drivers, and in the 
underground coai mining sector, where the 
United Mineworkers negotiated a master 
agreement with the Bituminous Coal Opera- 
tor-s~ssociation (Kochan, Katz, and ~ c ~ e r s i e  
1986:128-30; Katz and Kochan 1992:195- 
97). 
There were also widespread reports of a 
shift to the plant level awayfrom companywide 
agreements. In many cases, such as the auto, 
tire, and airline industries, the negotiations 
that were affected by this change were those 
on local pay or work rule concessions. Often 
these negotiations involved whipsawing by 
management, with local unions and workers 
being threatened with the prospect of a plant 
closing if adequate concessions were not 
granted (Cappelli 1985; Katz 1985:63-71; 
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986: 11 7-27; 
Turner 1991 :31-90; Parker and Slaughter 
1988:74-87). In the winter of 1992. a well- 
publicized illustration of this process entailed 
competition between the local unlons at the 
Arlington and Willow Run assembly plants in 
the face of General Motors' threat to close 
one of the two plants as part of its downsizing. 
In some other plants, concessions on work 
ruleswere accompanied by new arrangements 
that provided extensive participation bywork- 
ers and local union officers in decisions that 
had formerly been made solely by manage- 
ment (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986:146- 
205). In these cases, local bargaining took on 
the form of the "wildcat cooperation" Streeck 
(1984) had predicted. 
Even where company-level collective bar- 
gaining continued, negotiations in the 1980s 
produced diverse agreements across compa- 
nies that replaced strong pattern bargaining 
in some industries (which informally had 
served to centralize bargaining at the multi- 
employer level). Erickson (1992), for ex- 
ample, documents the emergence of signifi- 
cant inter-company variation in the aero- 
space industry, and Katz (1985) and Katz and 
Meltz (1991) describe similarvariation across 
the auto assembly companies. Inter-industry 
as well as intra-industry pattern bargaining 
weakened. Budd's (1992) analysisreveals that 
the influence of a key auto contract settle- 
ment had "considerably smaller" effects in 
1987-90 than in 1955-79 on the contracts 
the UAW negotiated in industries other than 
auto assembiy (such as aerospace, auto parts, 
and agricultural implements) .I2 
Testing the effects of bargaining structure 
on wage outcomes, Erickson (1990) found 
that the positive returns formal centralized 
bargaining and pattern-following exerted on 
manufacturing wages from 1959 to 1978 sub- 
stantially weakened from 1979 to 1984. In 
Erickson's estimated equations explaining 
manufacturing wage determination, the co- 
efficients on all the institutional measures of 
centralized bargaining (except industrywide 
pattern bargaining) go to zero in the later 
period. 
The American research literature has nu- 
merous accounts of bargaining at the plant 
and work-group level that involve the sort of 
productivity coalitions that appeared in other 
I2Ready (1990) claims that pattern bargaining had 
not declined as of 1983. 
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countrles. Furthermore, as In other coun- 
tries, these negotiations typically involved 
work organization, team systems, pay-for- 
knowledge and other contingent compensa- 
tion mechanisms, and changes in work time 
arrangements (Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 
1986:146-205; Cutcher-Gershenfeld 1991; 
Arthur 1992) .L3Agr~wlngliterature (r viewed 
in Katz and Keefe 1992) examines the effects 
of changes in work organization on plant- 
level economic performance.14There are also 
widespread reports of more direct communi- 
cation between managers and workers in the 
union sector in the United States that are 
very similar to developments in Britain and 
other countries (Eaton and Voos 1992; 
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986:132-34). 
Similarities in Trends Across 
the Six Countries 
There are many similarities in the changes 
under way in bargaining structure across the 
six countries. In all countries, the intensity of 
local bargaining, whether it involved local 
unions, work groups, or works councils, In- 
creased substantially in recent years. Much of 
this bargaining involved qualitative issues 
concerning work organization and work re- 
structuring. In some cases this local bargain- 
ing concerned pay Increases, and in many 
countrles contingent pay methods surfaced 
as an issue in local bargaining. In all coun- 
tries except Germany, there has been a down- 
ward shift in the formal structure of bargain- 
ing and a consequent reduction in the fre- 
quency of multi-employer bargaining. 
Whether or not company-level bargaining 
persisted, the frequency and importance of 
plant-level bargaining rose widely. 
Except for Australia (which had special 
circumstances because of the presence of an 
accord between unions and the government), 
the downward shift in bargaining structure 
13The work tlme negotlatlons In the Un~ted  States, 
In contrast to those In Germany, do not lnvolve reduc- 
tlons in work hours. Rather, they Involve lncreaslng the 
flexlbll~ty of work tlme by lntroduc~ng, for example, 
three-sh~ft operations. 
14An lnterestlng example of t h ~ s  llne of research 1s 
Cutcher-Gershenfeld (1991) 
came in response to employer initiatives, and 
central unions were opposed to this shift. 
Only the employers in industries with small 
production scales and modest capital require- 
ments preferred to retain centralized bargain- 
ing structures. Furthermore, even in Germany, 
where multi-employer bargaining persisted, 
its influence declined as these agreements 
provided minimum employment terms rather 
than, as in the past, contractual standards. 
Although decentralization is documented 
in many case studies and descriptive accounts, 
there is very little quantitative survey evi- 
dence providing longitudinal measures of 
bargaining structure. The best available evi- 
dence of this sort, from the three British 
workplace surveys, is consistent with the case 
evidence reported in Br~tain and with the 
changes noted in other countries discussed 
in this paper. Across the six countries there 
was not a single major industry in which 
collective bargaining moved from the plant 
level to the industry or multi-employer level. 
Although union membership decline is 
not the subject of this paper, lt is important to 
keep in mind that deunionization represents 
an extreme form (perhaps the ultimate form) 
of bargaining structure decentralization. As 
unionization declines, fewer workers are cov- 
ered by any sort of labor contract. Unorga- 
nized employees have their employment con- 
dit~ons determined e~ther  exclusively by em- 
ployers and the market or through individual 
(formal or informal) bargains. Across the six 
countries included in this review, post-1980 
trends in union density varied: union density 
declined substantially in the United States, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom, declined less 
severely in Australia, held steady in Germany, 
and rose in Sweden (Blanchflower and Free- 
man 1992, Table 1). Thus, although union- 
izat~on trends are mixed, if deunionlzation is 
counted as a form of decentralization and IS 
added to all the other evidence reviewed 
above, the movement downward in bargain~ng 
across the six countries is quite spectacular. 
Why Is Bargaining Structure 
Decentralizing? 
In this section I examine the hypotheses 
that have been offered most frequently to 
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explain why the structure of collective bar- 
gaining has been decentralizing in recent 
years. The three leading hypotheses are that 
decentralization results from shifts in bar- 
gaining power, the spread of new work orga- 
nization that puts a premium on flexibility 
and employee participation, and a decen- 
tralization of corporate structure and diversi- 
fication of worker preferences. For each of 
the first two explanations there is a version of 
the hypothesis suggesting that the decen- 
tralization will be short-lived, and another 
predicting that it will be long lasting. I first 
describe each of the hypotheses and then 
evaluate the evidence. Examination of these 
hypotheses is valuable, in part because un- 
derstanding the cause of decentralization 
helps clarify the potential effects of the 
changes under way in bargaining structure. 
Shifts in Bargaining Power 
One explanation for bargaining structure 
decentralization is that it results from an 
increase in management's power. In this vein, 
bargaining structure is viewed both as a re- 
flection of the parties' relative power and as 
a determinant of power. As Windmuller 
(1987:86) noted in describing labor and 
management's preferences for bargaining 
structure in various countries, "In so far as 
preferences do exlst, they are predominantly 
the outcome of assessments by the parties of 
how their interests-that is, their relative 
bargaining power-will best be served." 
Recent bargaining structure decentraliza- 
tion can be interpreted as a reversal of unions' 
previous success in using centralized bar- 
gaining to take wages out of competition. As 
employers acquired more bargaining lever- 
age, a change itself caused by intensified 
international competition and declines in 
union membership and political strength, 
they pushed to decentralize the structure of 
bargaining with the expectation that this 
change would produce bargaining outcomes 
more favorable to management. 
Management need not be using more de- 
centralized bargaining solely to win lower 
wage settlements at the bargaining table for 
this hypothesis to hold. For example, 
Pontusson and Swenson (1992) argue that 
Swedish employers particularly wished to see 
a widening of skill differentials and felt un- 
able to gain such a widening in the tradi- 
tional centralized structure. The main point 
in this hypothesis is that decentralization is 
used by employers to achieve more favorable 
bargaining outcomes and was sought prima- 
rily for that purpose. In this account, employ- 
ers have used the bargaining power advan- 
tage they gained from shifts in the economic 
environment to promote a change in the 
process of bargaining (decentralization) that 
enables them to gain advantages at the bar- 
gaining table. 
A "temporaryn variant of this hypothesis 
sees decentralization as a useful tool through 
which employers have gained bargaining 
power advantage. The idea here is that it is 
the process of decentralization that is most 
important. Employers seem to benefit most 
from the ability to play plants (and local 
unions) off against one another-that is, to 
whipsaw local unions. Yet, after gaining lower 
wage outcomes or wider skill differentials 
through whipsawing, employers may in the 
future prefer to return to centralized bar- 
gaining because of the advantages it provldes 
(stability, pred~ctability, and economies of 
scale). 
In this "temporary" account, employers 
need decentralized bargaining to gain the 
concessions they desire because central 
unions are unwilling to grant them, whereas 
local unions are more willing to do so. How 
do we explain central unions' unwillingness 
to lower labor costs or widen skill differen- 
tials if that unwillingness causes employers to 
try to whipsaw local unions? This question 
needs to be addressed, particularly in light of 
the fact that central unions have a strong 
interest in preserving the key role they play in 
centralized bargaining. Potential explana- 
tions for central unions' recalcitrance are 
that they have a sluggish perception of the 
need for change or a lack of sensitivity to 
changing economic circumstances or to the 
threat of unemployment. 
It is also possible to view decentralization 
as a product of the decline of the bargaining 
power held by both management and unions 
(that is, a decline in the absolute level of 
power) and not as a product of the relatzue 
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decline of labor's power. This explanation 
extends the argument contained in previous 
quantitative analyses of the determinants of 
bargaining power (Hendricks and Kahn 1982; 
Deaton and Beaumont 1980; Greenberg 
1967). These analyses find that in earlier 
periods, among multiplant firms with single- 
firm agreements, collective bargaining tended 
to be more centralized the more concen- 
trated the industry (since more concentrated 
industries have greater economic rents to be 
shared).I5 Following this logic, recent in- 
creases in economic competition and inter- 
national trade have reduced the economic 
rents available to labor and management and 
thereby spurred decentralization in bargain- 
ing structures. 
Productivity Coalitions Focused Around 
Changes in Work Organization 
A second explanation claims that it is the 
rise in the importance of work organization 
and shop flodr issues that has led-to decen- 
tralization in collective bargaining. As Streeck 
(1984) noted, economic pressures and more 
flexible technologies have led labor and 
management to restructure the workplace. 
At some sites these negotiations have pro- 
ceeded to the point that local unions and 
workers have become "co-managers of the 
internal labor market." As a result of these 
pressures, non-wage issues have been elevated 
in importance, and negotiation of these 
"qualitative" issues is contributing to decen- 
tralization. Thorough documentation of the 
existence of shop floor bargaining over work 
restructuring is found in a wide range of 
recent industrial relations research, includ- 
ing Turner (1991), Thelen (1991), Locke 
(forthcoming), and Mathews (1989). 
Although the intensity of plant- and work 
group-level negotiations over work restruc- 
turing is apparent, it is less clear exactly why 
negotiations over work restructuring and 
qualitative issues are occurring at local rather 
than central levels. What is it about these 
issues, their implementation, or the process 
through which labor and management are 
settling disputes concerning these matters, 
that has led to intensified local bargaining? 
Decentralization may follow from local 
bargaining because the identification of in- 
novations and the implementation of new 
forms of work organization require direct 
participation by workers and local union of- 
ficials. A central union, for example, cannot 
come up with a new method of team work 
that is negotiated centrallywith management 
and then applied across local work sites, be- 
cause the process of identifying an efficient 
(or acceptable) team work system and imple- 
menting it requzres the active participation of 
local actors. 
A related claim is that the new work orga- 
nization involves changes in a variety of em- 
ployment practices, including team work, 
performance-based pay methods, participa- 
tory programs, extensive training, and, in 
some cases, employment security (Katz and 
Kochan 1992:331-41). Thus, what the war- 
ties at the local level aie doing is discovering, 
and then implementing, new packages of 
employment policies. ~ufthermore, there are 
many different appropriate new packages of 
employment practices that make the central 
negotiation 02 these matters impractical and 
" 
inefficient. As a result, it is not possible for 
central negotiations to develop new practices 
and then enforce standardized lodal adop- 
tion of those practices. This explanation for 
decentralization assumes that the new work 
organization involves an honest dose of 
worker involvement, and it implicitly dis- 
agrees with critics of "joint processes," who 
assert that participation is largely a ruse or a 
device to co-opt workers and unions.I6 
There is also a "temporary" version of the 
work organization account of bargaining 
decentralization. In this view, the intensified 
local bargaining over work restructuring is a 
product of the parties' struggles to identify 
new practices that work well. In effect, local 
bargaining has followed from a process of 
expenmentatzon through which labor and man- 
I5Another finding of these statistical analyses was 
that multl-firm agreements were more common In 16For criticism of worker part~clpatlon and joint 
industries with low degrees of concentration activities, see Parker and Slaughter (1988) 
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agement are searching for effective new prac- 
tices. Bargaining is occurring locally so as to 
provide a range of experimentation and di- 
versity, because centralized negotiations 
would be too sluggish and too limited. This 
sort of local experimentation, however, may 
well only be a temporary phenomenon that 
will recede once labor and management have 
identified successful new work practices. 
Under this scenario, local bargaining was 
necessary only as a learning process, and 
central unions and employer groups may 
eventually become the negotiators of qualita- 
tive issues once they have learned from their 
more innovative local branches. 
There is little if any evidence suggesting 
that, as predicted in the "temporary experi- 
mentation" explanation for decentralization, 
the negotiation of work restructuring has 
begun to shift upward after local parties have 
identified successful strategies. As discussed 
below, there is evidence that central unions 
were initially caught off guard by the decen- 
tralization of bargaining, and in many coun- 
tries they appear to have lost control over this 
process. In some of these countries central 
unions have begun to define a coordznatzng 
role for themselves, but this has not 
amounted to an upward shift in the negotia- 
tion of work restructuring. Thus, there ap- 
pears to be a high degree of permanence in 
the local negotiation of work reorganization. 
Diversification of Corporate Structure or 
Worker Interests 
Another explanation for the decentraliza- 
tion of bargaining structure focuses on in- 
creased diversification of both corvorate 
structure and worker interests. On the corpo- 
rate side, this explanation views decentral- 
ized bargaining asa product of corporations' 
decentralization of their internal organiza- 
tional structure, which has increased the in- 
dependence of business units or profit cen- 
ters. Bargaining decentralization is seen as a 
natural consequence of a process in which 
more direct responsibility fbr industrial rela- 
tions is being passed to lower-level managers 
in the decentralized corporation (Purcell 
and Ahlstand 1989; Marginson e t  al. 
1988:183; Lansbury and Niland 1992:13; 
Kochan, Katz, and McKersie 1986:62-65). 
The push for corporate diversification and 
decentralization itself is said to be a product 
of such economic pressures as volatility and 
uncertainty in the economic environment, 
the shift from mass to specialized product 
markets, and increasedvariation in economic 
pressures across business lines. These eco- 
nomic pressures combine to put a greater 
premium on flexibility as the corporation 
searches for ways to more quickly respond to 
rapidly changing and competitive environ- 
ments (Piore and Sabel 1984). 
Consideration of the "corporate structural 
decentralization" explanation calls for a re- 
turn to the basic question of the appropriate 
degree of centralization of industrial rela- 
tions func tions inside the corporation. Along- 
standing literature that bears on that ques- 
tion is the research on corporate strategy and 
structure (Chandler 1962). The most exten- 
sive literature discussing corporate structure 
as an explanation for recent bargaining de- 
centralization appears in the United King- 
dom. Purcell and Ahlstand (1989:406) find, 
for example, that corporate diversification 
spurs decentralization of the industrial rela- 
tions staff function.I7 
One intriguing finding of British research- 
ers is that multinational corporations are less 
likely than other corporations to engage in 
multi-employer bargaining (Marginson et al. 
1988:27). This tendency may result from the 
multinational firm's desire to pursue corpo- 
rate objectives and not respond to the spe- 
cific economic (or industrial relations) pres- 
sures in the countries in which they are en- 
gaged in either production or sales. The 
increasing prevalence of multinational trade 
and multinational firms may thus help ex- 
plain the declines in multi-employer bargain- 
ing that have occurred in a number of coun- 
tries. Furthermore, multinational firms' pro- 
gressive rationalization of their production 
processes (centralizing production in one 
country while selling products in many) may 
I7A number of other researchers analyze the ~nflu- 
ence of corporate structure See, for example, 
Marglnson et  a1 (1988 184) and Brown and Walsh 
(1991) 
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have intensified their Interest in centralizing 
corporate control over industrial relations 
and increased thelr desire to avoid multi- 
employer bargaining." These factors do not 
explain, however, why collective bargaining 
in recent years has become more decentral- 
ized even within multinational firms (as well 
as within domestic firms). 
A widening diversity in worker interests 
(or erosion of worker solidarity) can explain 
bargaming structure decentralization in a 
manner that parallels the corporate diversifi- 
cation argument.lg The claim in this case is 
that workers have become less willing to join 
together to pursue common objectives or 
sacrifice their own personal gain for the ben- 
efit of other workers. This change of heart 
implies a decline in the appeal of centralized 
bargaining structures producing standard- 
ized labor contract terms. The rivalry be- 
tween public and prlvate sector workers (and 
unions) in Sweden, and the deleterious ef- 
fects this rivalry has had on centralized bar- 
gaining there, fits this explanation. One could 
also point to the increased demographic di- 
versity of the work force to argue that this 
factor plays a widespread role. 
Evaluation of the Evidence and 
the Three Hypotheses 
Evidence in support of the hypothesis that 
increased management power has led to de- 
centralization is that management has char- 
acteristically pushed aggressively for decen- 
tralized bargaining while central unions have 
opposed it. Also supporting this hypothesis is 
the fact that in many cases decentralized 
bargaining has been associated with the ne- 
gotiation of pay and work rule concessions at 
the plant level. Such concessions are com- 
monplace in the United States and have been 
noted In many other countries. Erickson's 
statistical analysis, discussed above, also lends 
credence to thls hypothesis by finding evi- 
dence that centralized bargaining previously 
had a positive effect on union wages in the 
United States. Although the above evidence 
181 am grateful to Jan Katz for suggesting this polnt 
I9I am grateful to Peter Doeringer for suggesting 
t h ~ s  polnt 
is supportive of the power hypothesis, to date 
there have been no clear empirical tests of 
this hypothesis. 
My reading of the qualitative evidence 
suggests that both the long and temporary 
versions of the bargaining power hypothesis 
have some credibility. Unions clearly have 
been on the defensive in many countries, 
particularly in countries such as the United 
States and United Kingdom, and the decline 
in union bargaining power appears to have 
contributed to their inability to resist em- 
ployer efforts to decentralize bargaining. At 
the same time, the increase in managements' 
power does not appear to fully explain recent 
events. For one thing, it is not obvlous that 
traditional centralized bargaining was so ad- 
vantageous to unions (and disadvantageous 
to employers) in the first place. As Weber 
(1961) and others have noted, centralized 
bargaining was useful to some employers as a 
mechanism for avoiding union whipsawing. 
The most extreme traditional case of bar- 
gaining structure centralization, Sweden, can 
be viewed as an illustration of the wage mod- 
eration and stability produced by bargaining 
structure centralization. And if centralized 
bargaining did not favor unions, ~t is not clear 
why employers would seek to eliminate it now 
that they have more bargaining power. 
Another problem with the bargaining 
power hypothesis is the fact that local unions 
and workers often have supported the decen- 
tralization of collective bargaining. It 1s con- 
ceivable that local unions, trapped in a fight 
for survival, agree to decentralization simply 
as part of a package of concessions in return 
for keeping their own plant In business. Yet, 
the case study accounts (discussed above) of 
the productivity coalitions that are formed in 
the now widespread local bargaining suggest 
that survival is not the only incentive. Local 
union leaders as well as workers at many sites 
appear to enjoy the participation in shop 
floor and strategic business decisions they 
have gained, and they also benefit from some 
of the more flexible work schedules that have 
been negotiated. If local unions and workers 
are realizing gains through local bargaining, 
an implication is that decentralization does 
not result only from shifts in power. 
In addition, it is hard to see how the union 
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weakness argument can be applied to the 
case of Germany. There, local bargaining 
increased in importance and scope even 
though union representation held steady and 
unions made gains in wage and work hours 
bargaining in the 1980s. The bargainingstruc- 
ture decentralization under way in Germany 
hardly appears to be a product ofweak unions. 
My reading of the evidence suggests, con- 
sistent with the second decentralization hy- 
pothesis, that both labor and management 
gain clear advantages from the work restruc- 
turing that is under way in many workplaces. 
More local bargaining seems to be a natural 
product of the increase in worker and union 
participation in enterprise and shop floor 
decision making. It also appears that local 
bargaining is essential for the identification 
and implementation of new more flexible 
forms of work organ~zation. Thus, I am led to 
the view that work reorganization has played 
a significant role as a cause of bargaining 
structure decentralization. 
Although decentralization in corporate 
structure and diversity in worker preferences 
may also have played a role in spurring bar- 
gaining structure decentralization, as pre- 
dicted by the third decentralization hypoth- 
esis, there is little evidence that these factors 
are widespread enough to explain the exten- 
sive decentralization in bargaining that has 
occurred. Furthermore, although the litera- 
ture on corporate decentralization and di- 
versification is extremely informative, it is 
difficult to tell if the bargaining decentraliza- 
tion that researchers are attributing to corpo- 
rate decentralization is in fact a product of 
the factors associated with the other two de- 
centralization hypotheses discussed above. 
The Changing Roles of Central Unions and 
Corporate Industrial Relations Staffs 
Central Union Roles 
Although the actions taken by labor and 
management In response to pressures for 
decentralization may not be the initial cause 
of bargaining structure decentralization, 
these actions may influence both the form 
and degree of bargaining structure decen- 
tralization. Thus, to fully understand how 
decentralization of bargaining has occurred 
and what its consequences have been, we 
need to examine how it has challenged 
unions' and managements' roles. This analy- 
sis also provides an informative illustration of 
the effects strategic choices can have on the 
bargaining process and bargaining outcomes. 
In all of the countries examined in this 
paper except Australia, central unions o p  
posed decentralization of bargaining, though 
in all cases without apparent success. Their 
opposition seems to derive from the fact that 
central bodies lose power and, to some ex- 
tent, their function as the focus of bargaining 
shifts to the firm or plant level. As power 
shifts to local unions, they become more 
difficult to control, and the likelihood of 
political challenges to central union author- 
ity increases. Streeck (1984) and Katz and 
Sabel (1985) suggested early on that central 
unions would be hard pressed to define new 
roles as decentralization proceeded, and ex- 
periences in the late 1980s and early 1990s 
have validated their warnings. 
Yet, the evidence from the six countries 
suggests that unlons can influence the nature 
of bargaining structure and are notjust pas- 
sive recipients of a "decentralization effect." 
Consider the contrast between events in Ger- 
many and Britain. In Britain there has been 
extensive decentralization in wage setting as 
well as an increase in the intensity of plant- 
level discussion of work organization and 
flexibility issues, although apparently less of 
the latter than has been occurring in Ger- 
many and a number of the other countries. 
German unions, meanwhile, have avoided 
any decentralization in wage setting and any 
other change in the formal structure of col- 
lective bargaining. At the same time, there 
has been an intensification of negotiations 
inside works councils and on the shop floor 
concerning work reorganization in Germany. 
It may be that the pressure on unions to 
cut wages was greater in Britain's economic 
and political environment than in Germany's. 
Another driving force, however, may have 
been the initiative taken by German central 
unions to develop a role whereby they pro- 
vided substantial coordination and guidance 
to local efforts to respond to economic 
pressures. 
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Turner (1991) andThelen (1991) describe 
how I G Metall, in particular, maintained a 
strong role in recent bargaining, with strong 
unlon membersh~p and substantial political 
influence. During the 1980s, I G Metal1 pro- 
moted group work schemes and helped guide 
and structure the changes being made at the 
plant level in the introduct~on of these plans 
(Turner 1991:lll-17). And as discussed ear- 
lier, although work time reductions were 
implemented with much variation and input 
from works councils, this process followed 
guidelines and parameters contained in con- 
tract language centrally negotiated by I G 
Metal1 and employers. 
Brit~sh central trade unions were less suc- 
cessful than their German counterparts at 
defining a new role as the coordinator of 
local initiatives. Two effects of this weakness 
may have been greater decentralization of 
wage negotiations than would otherwise have 
occurred and, since local unlons and workers 
received little or no policy guidance from 
their central unions, less extensive work reor- 
ganization on the shop floor. The challenge 
confronting central unions in this era of 
u 
bargain~ng decentralization is to develop an 
expanded coordinating role-in effect, to 
create a modern version of the "connective 
bargaining" earlier described by Ulman 
(1974) .20 
It is noteworthy that even German unions 
have had troubles redefining their role in the 
face of the growing influence of works coun- 
cils. Thelen (1991) and Katz and Sabel(1985) 
suggest that one explanation for I G Metall's 
forceful campaign for work hours reductions 
in the mid- and late 1980s was that the central 
officers in the union were searching for a way 
to regain the initiative in the face of the 
increasing involvement of works councils in 
local bargaining. Work hours was a relatively 
traditional subject, and one that the central 
offices of I G Metal1 knew how to bargain 
201n connective bargain~ng, as described by Ulman 
(1974), the central (often national) un~on  1s lnvolved 
In local unlon affalrs through its involvement in the 
administration of grievances (for Instance, declding 
whether a grievance can go to arbitration) and In the 
approval of local union strlke actions (for instance, by 
not wlthholdlng strlke funds) 
over. Meanwhile, I G Metall's membersh~p 
was still growing, and the union was able in 
the 1980s to negotiate wage gains and avoid 
the sort of concessions typically granted in 
this period by most other unions in other 
countries. Thus, the problems created by 
decentralized bargainkg for the central of- 
fices of I G Metal1 should serve as an indica- 
tion of the extent to which much less secure 
unions in other countries mav have been 
troubled by these events. 
The research also suggests that some 
unions take time to find their new roles in the 
face of intens~fied local bargaining. For ex- 
ample, Locke (1992 and forthcoming) ar- 
gues that central unions in Italy learned from 
their failures at Fiat in the early 1980s, and by 
the tlme local bargaining was intensifying at 
Alfa Romeo, the central unions had more 
clearly figured out how they could positively 
guide events rather than be pushed to the 
sidelines. In the United States there also has 
been wide variation in the character and 
intensity of central unions' responses to the 
increase in local bargaining (Katz 1988). 
The Corporate Industrial Relations Function 
Corporate industrial relations staffs also 
face major changes in their roles as a result of 
the decentralization of collective bargaining. 
The shift in influence from corporate to 
plant or division industrial relations staffs 
(Storey 1992; ZRRR 1989; Kochan, Katz, and 
McKersie 1986: 197-20 1 ) has had pluses and 
minuses for local industrial relations manag- 
ers. Although the power of these local staffs 
rises as they acquire more direct responsibil- 
ity for bargaining, that responsibility is gen- 
erally accompanied by greater financial pres- 
sures than they experienced before; in some 
cases they become subject for the first time to 
explicit cost controls (ZRRR 1990; Marginson 
et al. 1988:183). The redistribution of the 
responsibility for bargaining has, however, 
been variable. Even where the formal struc- 
ture of bargaining has shifted to plant or 
business unit levels, corporate staffs may con- 
tinue to set guidelines or exercise informal 
influence on the negotiations occurring at 
local levels (Sisson 1992; Marglnson et al. 
1988:151). 
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In addition, managerial industrial rela- 
tions staffs at several levels have seen their 
influence decline as more direct authority 
and responsibility for industrial relations (and 
human resource) issues has been shifting to 
operating and line managers (Kochan, G t z ,  
and McKersie 1986:131-32). Storey, for ex- 
ample, provides evidence in Britain of "a 
more active role for line and general manag- 
ers in setting the direction of human re- 
source policy" (1992:202) .21 
corporate industrial relations managers 
face many problems that parallel those con- 
fronting central union staffs. As bargaining 
began shifting to local levels and focusing 
more on qualitative issues concerning work 
restructuring, corporate staffs were initially 
caught off-guard by the diminution of their 
influence. These corporate managers (like 
central unions) are searching to find new 
roles for themselves through which they can 
provide guidance in local bargaining and 
help coordinate local initiatives. One example 
of ;matter on which their guidance may one 
day be needed is whipsawing by unions. Al- 
though the economic climate at present gives 
employers the whipsaw advantage, over the 
long term there are likely to be cases in which 
aggressive unions can use the decentraliza- 
tion of bargaining to whipsaw employers. 
Central staffs, as well as local management 
staffs, will have to find ways to respond to 
such challenges without the assistance pro- 
vided formerly through central bargaining 
structures and the standardizat~on of em- 
ployment conditions that typically followed 
from this centralization. 
Research Gaps 
There is much need for more research 
examining variation across countries in 
changes under way in bargaining structure. 
In many ways, the research reviewed in this 
paper provides only a preliminary analysis of 
these developments. 
It will be interesting to examine, for ex- 
ample, what, if any, effects on bargaining 
structure result from European market inte- 
g ra t i~n . '~  Although the emergence of Euro- 
pean-wide works councils may serve to 
recentralize bargaining structure, steps to- 
ward European integration have as yet had 
few substantive effects on bargaining out- 
comes or structure. 
I have found that although there is wide- 
spread case and descriptive evidence of de- 
centralization in bargaining structures, there 
are very few systematic quantitative data trac- 
ing the evolution of bargaining structure. 
The best longitudinal survey data on bargain- 
ing structure are from the British work place 
surveys; in addition, a useful survey of Austra- 
lian practices has recently been completed. 
Survey data from other countries would help 
clarify the depth of the changes being noted in 
the many case studies. Longitudinal quantita- 
tive data tracking bargaining structure would 
also help in searching for the determinants of 
decentralization and measuring the extent to 
which these factors vary across industries or 
countries. Of course, the various causal factors 
may be so closely interrelated that the search 
for "independent" causation may be in vain. 
It is clear that much of the decentraliza- 
tion in collective bargaining was initiated by 
managers who expected to gain more favor- 
able bargaining outcomes through that 
change, but there is very little evidence on 
whether managers gained what they expected. 
Knowledge of how bargaining structure de- 
centralization has affected bargaining out- 
comes would be informative in its own right, 
and it would also help explain why decen- 
tralization is occurring. 
There is also much more to be learned 
concerning the long-term consequences of 
bargaining structure decentralization for 
central union and corporate industrial rela- 
tions staff functions. It would be extremely 
interesting to know, for example, whether 
(and if so, how) certain unions or managers 
were able to respond more successfully than 
others to the role challenges created by bar- 
gaining decentralization. Furthermore, more 
research is needed to clarify how union and 
"As Illustrated In a number of the case examples 
prov~ded In Storey (1992), these human resource poll- 
cles ~nclude ~ndustr~al relat~ons p o l ~ c ~ e s  and Issues. 
2'Streeck (1991) prov~desprovocatlve thoughtscon- 
cernlng the effects of European lntegratlon on ~ndus- 
tr~al relat~ons and unlon power 
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management strategies influenced the na- 
ture and extent of bargaining structure de- 
centralization. 
Decentralized collective bargaining has 
focused on different issues across the more 
advanced economies in the world. For ex- 
ample, key issues in dispute in Germany and 
the United States have been working time 
and work organization, respectively. Why this 
variation in the focus of local bargaining? Is 
it a product of different economic pressures, 
or of different local institutions and bargain- 
ing histories? Thelen (1992) makes a good 
start in addressing these issues by emphasiz- 
ing the role played by national institutional 
"starting points" and union membership lev- 
els, but much remains to be done. 
Locke (1992) argues that the decentraliza- 
tion of collective bargaining challenges in- 
dustrial relations theory as much as it chal- 
lenges unions and management. He claims 
that the variation in industrial relations prac- 
tice resulting from the productivity coali- 
tions emerging at many plants (and the ab- 
sence of such coalitions in other firms and 
plants) leads to the end of distinctive na- 
tional systems of industrial relations. Does it 
make sense to speak of a distinctive Italian or 
German industrial relations system if there is 
wider variation within each of these coun- 
tries in industrial relations practices than 
there is between the practices characteristic 
of each country? To answer this question and 
many others requires more extensive research 
describing the nature and consequences of 
the decentralization of collective bargaining. 
My assessment of recent evidence suggests 
that work reorganization plays a particularly 
important role in stimulating bargaining 
decentralization. Why it does so, however, 
and how prior institutions and histories shape 
the outcomes and process of the resulting 
local bargaining concerning work reorgani- 
zation, are unclear. The local bargaining that 
is associated with work reorganization often 
involves informal interactions between labor 
and management. Yet, much of the language 
and theory developed to explain traditional 
bargaining structures is oriented toward more 
formal types of interaction. Thus, understand- 
ing the decentralization of bargaining may 
require the development of new concepts 
and theory, as well as a downward shift in the 
focus of research. 
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